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Aesthetic Experience — a topic at the cross-roads 
between philosophy and psychology
To deal with the topic o f aesthetic experience on a congress ded ica ted  
to »Aesthetics as Philosophy« provokes som e critical rem arks from  a  psy­
chologist. I th ink  that, due to the subjective n a tu re  of experience , it can n o t 
be grasped adequately  by a m ere philosophical explanation . This is the rea­
son why I want to con tribu te  to this congress and  in particu lar to the discus­
sions o f this section dealing with aesthetic experience som e critical reflec­
tions on  the ro le  o f  philosophy an d  psychology in investigating aesthetic 
experience.
At this p o in t I w ant to stress tha t this should  n o t be u n d ersto o d  as an  
a ttem pt to renew  the controversy dom inating  the aesthetic discussion at the 
beg inn ing  o f o u r century, nam ely w h e th er aesthetics shou ld  be g ro u n d ed  
on a philosophy o f values or on  the base o f em pirical psychology an d  w hether 
it shou ld  be re g a rd e d  a ph ilo soph ical o r a psychological d isc ip line  (cf. 
Allesch 1 9 8 7 ) .  Such »questiones iuris« usually rem ain  unsolved, as R ichard 
M u e l l e r  -F r e ie n f e l s  stated  already in 1 9 2 5 , however volum inous volum es 
m ight be published  abou t them . It is n o t my in ten tion  to declare  w hether 
aesthetics should  be p art o f philosophy or psychology, however, I w ant to 
stress som e argum ents why aesthetics should  be conceived as an  in terd isci­
plinary project, and  why I th ink that aesthedc experience is a  distinctive topic 
to exemplify this suggestion.
L et m e start with a question  th a t has been  a central topic o f  aesthetic 
discussion since aesthetics exists as a particu lar d iscipline, nam ely: W hat 
m akes an experience an aesthetic experience? You know th a t th ere  are two 
types o f answers in the history o f o u r discipline: T he one, m ore  objectivistic 
answer, points to the particular aesthetic na tu re  o f the aesthetic object. This 
m eans th a t the psychic o r m ental processes by which an aesthetic object is 
perceived do n o t essentially differ from  o th er processes o f  perception . Thus, 
psychology th a t tries to explain the n a tu re  o f these processes w ould n o t be 
able to co n trib u te  any substantial evidence ab o u t the aesthetic  aspect o f 
aesthetic experience.
T he other, m ore subjectivistic answer, points to the fact th a t it depends 
on  the in ten tion  o f the b eho lder o r listener w hether a perceived object may 
be ex p e rien ced  as an  aesthetic object. In  this case, psychology has to be
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reg ard ed  as a key discipline for the u n d erstan d in g  an d  exp lanation  o f aes­
thetic  experience since it actually refers to these subjective in ten tio n s an d  
m otivations which will enable o r im pede the realisation of an aesthetic ex­
perience.
This was the reason why T h eo d o r L ipps, o n e  o f the m ost engaged  par­
tisans o f psychological aesthetics a t the beg inn ing  o f o u r century, c laim ed 
aesthetics to be a psychological discipline a t all since, as he  argued , its duty 
was to explain  u n d e r  w hich circum stances any object m ight be recognised  
as beautifu l and  this is actually w hat a psychological theory  o f experience 
was to achieve.
You know th a t this ex trem e argum en tation  in favour o f a psychologi­
cal conceptualisation  o f aesthetics is n o t held  any m ore in recen t theorising, 
n o t even in the con tem porary  psychology o f art. O n the one  hand , also psy­
chology o f  a rt accepted  th a t th ere  exists a certain  kind o f au tonom y o f aes­
thetic  objects which can n o t be explained by the particularities o f subjective 
experiencing . O n the o th e r hand , it was in particu lar the co n trib u tio n  o f 
phenom enological theories in aesthetics - 1 want to stress the work o f Moritz 
G e i g e r  as a paradigm  -  w hich revealed the com plex structu re  o f aesthetic 
experience and  convincingly suggested tha t w hat we call an  aesthetic object 
is fo rm ed by the activity o f a subject b u t constitutes a relation to a reality that 
itself constitu tes the possibilities o f  the subject to face an d  to experience 
reality.
However, I th ink  tha t it is n o t possible to ou tline a theory  o f aesthetic 
experience w ithout regard ing  some fundam ental evidence o f psychology on 
the  n a tu re  o f h u m an  experience. I concede th a t it may d ep en d  on the k ind  
o f  psychology which is taken into consideration  w hether this in terd iscip li­
nary  app ro ach  will lead us to a satisfactory result. I th ink  that som e m istakes 
an d  resen tm ents o f  aestheticians against a psychological in te rp re ta tio n  o f 
aesthetic p h en o m en a  does n o t resu lt from  an  essential incom patibility  o f 
psychology and  aesthetics b u t from  the fact tha t they have dealt with a w rong 
o r  incom patib le  psychology.
T hus I concede th a t a psychological theory  which is constructed  in the 
classical behavioristic m an n er o r in that m ore m o d ern  way o f  in fo rm ation  
processing theories will n o t be able to cover the particularities o f aesthetic 
experience. But this is a  type o f psychology the capability o f which to explain 
the  n a tu re  o f h um an  experiencing  should  be questioned  in general, tha t 
m eans n o t only with respect to aesthetic p henom ena . I th ink  th a t experi­
ence as p erfo rm ed  by a h u m an  being  living in a cu ltural con tex t and  con­
scious o f  its h istoric na tu re , tha t m eans being  able o r even forced  to reflect 
on  w here it com es from  and  w here it is to go, is totally d ifferen t from  the
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kind o f experience that can be m odelled  by those in fo rm ation  processing 
activities as p erfo rm ed  by a com puter, however perfec t an d  com plicated  it 
may be.
M odern  psychology has becom e m o re  an d  m ore aw are o f  this fact 
d u rin g  the last two decades b u t n o t all theoretical approaches have realised 
this developm ent to the sam e am ount. I w ant to ou tline now w hat k ind  o f 
psychology w ould be necessary in o rd e r to cope with the  particu larities o f 
aesthetic experience and  in what m an n er a psychological theory  o f experi­
ence could  be helpful for investigating this type o f aesthetic problem s.
L et m e start with the a rg u m en t that, if you consider aesthetics as the 
science o f aisthésis, that m eans, o f sensorial experience an d  n o t in  the  trad i­
tional sense as the science o f  art an d  beauty  you inevitably will cross the 
b o rd e rlin e  to the cen tra l d om ain  o f  psychology. It p o in ts  to th e  crucial 
am biguity o f the discipline d en o ted  by the term  »aesthetics« that, in o rd e r 
to em ancipate  from  a theory  o f »experience in general« (as p erfo rm ed , for 
exam ple, by K a n t  in his transcenden tal aesthetics as a p a rt o f his Critique of 
Pure Reason) it was to focus, in its historical shaping  as a scientific discipline, 
its in te rest to a certain  aspect o r type o f experience, nam ely w hat we refer 
to by the m o d ern  w ording »aesthetic«.
I th ink  th a t aesthetics has to find  its p ro p e r position betw een two ex­
trem es: It can n e ith e r be conceived as a science o f sensorial ex perience in 
general, n o r should  it stick to the traditional concepts o f beauty  an d  the arts 
as, fo r exam ple, W olfgang W e l s c h  convincingly argued  in his p lenary  lec­
ture on  »Aesthetics beyond aesthetics« at o u r last congress in Lahti.
It is exactly this focusing on a certain  ‘aesthetic’ type o f aisJhsiV tha t 
leads us back to o u r cen tral question: w hat m akes an aesthetic experience 
an  aesthetic experience, or: how shall we pragmatically define the term  ‘aes­
th e tic ’ in o rd e r  to d en o te  a type o f experience w hich m eets w hat we in ten d  
by the recen t u n d erstan d in g  o f the realm  o f o u r discipline?
Now I w ould like to change my p o in t o f view again to tha t o f a psycholo­
gist an d  ask fo r a useful psychological concep t such as »experience«. T he 
behaviorist d o c trin e  which excluded  all m ental p h en o m en a  w hich can n o t 
objectively be observed from  the realm  o f science was n o t able to conceive 
an d  was n o t even in terested  in a concep t like »experience«. W hatever ex­
p erience m igh t be an d  whatever m ight h ap p en  in o u r m in d  was re d u ced  to 
the ‘resp o n se’ as the observable ou tcom e o f in n e r processes. T h e  cognitive 
tu rn  in psychology which started  in the early fifties o f  o u r century, rejected  
the anti-m entalistic ban and  m ade the m ental processing w hich h ad  been  
excluded by the behaviorists the central subject o f psychology. However, until 
the seventies cognitive psychology un d ersto o d  percep tion  as » inform ation
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processing«, i. e. in that m echanical sense in which inform ation is processed 
by a technical system, since the boom ing in form ation  technology n u rtu re d  
the  expectation  tha t m ental processes could be m odelled  by the sam e kind 
o f in fo rm ation  processing which a com pu ter perform s.
It was a Gestalt psychologist who was also very engaged  in aesthetic  
investigations, nam ely R udolf A r n h e i m , who already in 1969, in his book 
Visual Thinking, stressed his conviction tha t h u m an  experience fu n d am en ­
tally differs from  com puterised  data  processing since it starts from  th e  field 
o f conscience, i. e. it proceeds from  the w hole to the parts and  n o t from  
single data  to a mechanically »com puted« result. In the same way, bu t as early 
as 1935 an o th e r scholar o f the G estalt psychology school, nam ely the psy­
ch iatrist Erwin S t r a u s  in  his im p o rtan t book The sense o f the senses h ad  sug­
gested  tha t »m an thinks and  n o t the brain«. It is exactly this question  fo r 
»the sense o f the senses« th a t leads psychology beyond the limits o f  a nar­
row -m inded m entalism  which w ould n o t be able to conceptualise »experi­
ence« in  o th e r than  m echanistic terms.
In  his fam ous ou tline o f semiotics, La struttura assente, U m berto  Eco 
distinguishes between »the world o f signals« and  »the world o f sense«, w here 
the  w orld o f signals is characterised  by tha t type o f inform ation  processing 
w hich can  be carried  o u t also by m achines while the shift from  the w orld o f 
signals to the w orld o f sense reflects the progression from  the  m echanical 
processing o f a m achine to the subjective world o f a hum an  being. This shift 
leads to an o th e r type o f  rep resen ta tion  o f the perceived outside world o r 
even to an o th e r type o f percep tion  which is m uch  closer to the m ean ing  o f 
the  term  »experience« than  to a term  such as »m ental represen ta tion«  as 
p re fe rred  by the cognitive psychology o f the eighties.
A lthough we have to assum e th a t w hat we phenom enologically  d en o te  
with the term  ‘ex p erien ce’ is based on  a certain  physical rep resen ta tio n  as 
p erfo rm ed  by biochem ical processes in o u r brain , there  is no  evidence for 
th e  existence o f p h en o m en a  com parable with h u m an  experience o n  the 
level o f technical systems. A nd there  are a lo t o f reasons to assum e th a t this 
is n o t a problem  o f com plexity b u t the resu lt o f  a fundam ental d ifference 
betw een biological systems created  by evolutionary processes and  technical 
systems designed  by m an.
You may realise the difference betw een technical signal-detection and  
h u m an  experience also by reflecting the m eaning  o f aesthetic concepts like 
musicality. A sophisticated  technical system like a high-tech tape reco rd e r 
may achieve m uch m ore precise results in analysing frequencies th an  h u ­
m an  beings b u t we w ould n o t assess this p erfec tio n  as an  ou tcom e o f  its 
niusicality. W hat we expect from  a perfec t tape reco rd e r is n o t m usicality
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b u t high fidelity: it would, in fact, be an  awful experience if a tape reco rd e r 
did  n o t rep resen t the acoustical structure o f music by a perfectly determ ined  
represen ta tion  but, for example, amplify the volum e o f the cello p a rt accord­
ing to its im m anen t aesthetic in terp re ta tion .
This is the reason  why psychological theorising  on h u m an  p ercep tio n  
d u rin g  the last decades increasingly startrd  to abandon  the use o f  technical 
m odels o f in fo rm ation  processing fo r the explanation  o f  the processes o f 
h u m an  experience . T he PDP-m odel o f h u m an  p ercep tio n  (w here ‘PD P’ 
stands for »parallel d istribu ted  processing«) as p roposed  by R u m e l h a r t  &  
M c C l e l l a n d  in  1986, explicitly asked the  question: »W hat m akes peop le  
sm arter than  m achines«, thus starting  from  the d ifference an d  n o t from  the 
analogy betw een com puter and  h um an  m ind.
However, also these m ost recen t branches o f cognitive psychology can­
n o t actually m ee t the particularity  o f aesthetic experience since they do  n o t 
d iffe ren tia te  betw een p ercep tio n  as an  objective func tion  o f the  h u m an  
m ind  an d  th a t subjective becom ing  aware o f  o u r personal ex istence in  a 
m eaningful world which may be b etter designated by the w ord »experience« 
than  by the term  »perception«. If we recu r to this »hum anistic« o r »experi­
ential« app ro ach  as G i f f o r d  called it in his ou tline o f Environmental Psychol­
ogy (1987) we have to realise th a t the  cognitive app ro ach  widely ignored  
som e essential aspects o f h um an  existence, nam ely the im pact o f em otions, 
the com plexity o f  m an-environm ent relations and  m an ’s involvem ent in cul­
ture.
It is, to my op in ion , in particu lar the recen t developm ent o f  psychol­
ogy o f cu ltu re th a t offers a plausible so lu tion  for these deficiencies but, in 
add ition  to that, leads to a concep t o f h u m an  experience in cu ltura l con­
text th a t m ight be regarded  as a useful psychological co n trib u tio n  to an  in­
terdisciplinary theory o f aesthedc experience. I want to oud ine two exam ples 
in  o rd e r to su p p o rt this statem ent.
T he first exam ple is the symbolic action theory  as developed  by Ernst 
E. B o e s c h , the nesto r o f G erm an cu ltura l psychology.
A lready in 1980, in his book Kultur und Handlung, B o e s c h  co ined  the 
fo rm ula  tha t cu ltu re  is »the b iotop o f  m an«. In  1991, B o e s c h  refo rm ulated  
his th eo re tic a l co n c ep t in  an  English re a d e r  en title d  »Symbolic A ction 
T heory  an d  C ultural Psychology«. B o e s c h  conceives the cu ltu ra l environ­
m en t as a »lim iting system« which, on  the o n e  hand , stim ulates, and , on  the 
o th e r hand , im pedes a certain  type o f action. This cu ltural significance o f 
actions is, mainly, m ediated  by the symbolic m eaning  o f the objects th a t form  
the  action field o f  a concrete  situation. Strictly speaking, B o e s c h  argues, we 
do  n o t perceive objects as physical objects, b u t as op tions for real ( B o e s c h
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says: praxic) o r im agined acting, which may have objective purposes as well 
as subjective-functional m ean ing  (for exam ple the rem em bering  o f sim ilar 
personal experiences). T he objects o f the hum an »field o f action« are, »from 
a psychological p o in t o f view, n o t objects per se b u t representatives o f sys­
tem s an d  processes th a t go beyond the object itself«. W hat we perceive as 
the  »form« o f an  object, is n o tju s t  som eth ing  »formal« like height, volum e 
o r  tex tu re b u t som eth ing  tha t is »formed« by cu ltural trad itions o f  perceiv­
ing  as well as by subjective desires and  potentialities o f  action. In  this con­
text, aesthetic objects play an  exceptional role.
It was in a small essay, Zwischen Angst und Triumph (Between anxiety and 
triumph), published in 1975 that Ernst B o e s c h  for the first time explicitly tried 
to apply his symbolic action theory  to the p h en o m en o n  o f aesthetic experi­
ence. In  this essay B o e s c h  argues that the aesthetic plays an  im p o rtan t role 
in  the  process o f the self which, in its lifelong a ttem p t to cope with itself and  
the  w orld, oscillates betw een encouragem en t an d  d iscouragem ent. W hat­
ever m akes the w orld m ore fam iliar to us is an  encourag ing  experience . 
Aesthetic experience means, according to B o e s c h , recognising o u r self within 
a world o f  symbolic form s which is »by no m eans to be lim ited to the work 
o f  art« b u t »may be stim ulated  by ou r fellow-beings, by natu re , o r even by 
an  idea o f particularly  p reg n an t potency« (1975, p. 73).
In o rd e r to explain that, B o e s c h  sets up  a ra th e r risky b u t typical anal­
ogy betw een listening to m usic and  skiing: Both activities have in com m on 
the  p leasure o f  following an ex ternal s tructu re by adequately rep ro d u cin g  
an d  re spond ing  to the »figures« perceived. It is the stim ulating  experience 
to  cope with reality, o f  being  able to transform  a form al idea in to  an  ad­
equate , harm onised  m ovem ent o f body and  m ind, th a t m akes bo th  activi­
ties in  a com parable m an n er a possible subject o f  an  aesthetic experience.
A n o th er in teresting  suggestion was ou tlined  by B o e s c h  in his book  The 
magic and the beautiful in 1983, w here he characterises the m agic an d  the 
beautifu l as contrasting  cu ltural attitudes to face reality: W hile the m agic 
a ttitu d e  towards objects expresses a distancing function , the em path ie  dis­
position , which has a particu lar re lation  to the aesthetic, stresses being  in 
harm ony  with the  world. T he aesthetic attitude thus tends »to ex p an d  the 
validity o f the in n e r images« an d  »to transform  counter-w orld in to  I-world«: 
T h e  »beautiful object« perceived by the aesthetic em pathy, as a »symbol o f 
in ten d ed  order« refers at the same time to the realisation o f this order, func­
tion ing  thus »as a co rrobora tion  o f the self in m uch m ore pivotal and  time- 
encom passing a sense th an  the m erely m om entary  and  concrete  success o f  
action« (1983, p. 316).
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In  Symbolic Action Theory and Cultural Psychology, B o e s c h  in troduces the 
m etap h o r o f »the trace« as a crucial concep t in o rd e r to conceptualise  the 
essence o f aesthetic activity: »The trace extends the im pact o f  our action into 
the ex ternal world, and  ... it derives its a ttraction  from  this ... subjectivizing 
the ex ternal reality.« This m eans th a t the aesthetic object form s »a ‘bridg­
ing ob ject’ in the sense o f spann ing  the cleavage betw een person  an d  m at­
ter, and  between individual and  group; it will, over time, even bridge the gap 
betw een p resen t and  past« (1991, p. 223).
I th ink tha t the m etap h o r »tracing reality« is a very good expression in 
o rd e r to illustrate how aesthetic experience is conceptualised  by th e  Sym­
bolic A ction T heory  o f B o e s c h  (cf. Allesch 1993), since it connota tes th a t 
this kind o f experience -  an d  even h um an  experience in general -  is m ore 
th an  ju s t »facing reality« and  m uch m ore than  »inform ation processing«.
If we in te rp re t o u r capacity to trace the possible ways o f changing, trans­
form ing and  transfiguring reality as an  essential prerequisite in  o rd e r to cope 
with all the m ore o r less im portan t problem s o f o u r life, we will u n d ers tan d  
th en  why aesthetic experience is able to  excite an d  to gratify by re in fo rc ing  
o u r self and , fu rth erm o re , as B o e s c h  puts it, why m en »put u p  with rem ark ­
able prices beauty fetches e ith er by d irec t expenses o r by tim e-consum ing 
activities like o rn am en tin g  o r dressing«.
I will n o t go in to  fu rth e r details b u t I ho p e  th a t you can agree with m e 
th a t this co n cep t offers very in teresting  topics for an  in terd iscip linary  dis­
cussion on  aesthetic experience.
A n o th er in teresting  concep t w hich I w ant to ou tline in  a few words is 
the sem iotic-ecological perspective as developed by Alfred L a n g , a disciple 
o f  B o e s c h  who, until recently, held  a chair for psychology a t the University 
o f B erne, Switzerland. L a n g  (1992) tries to overcom e the trad itional sepa­
ra tion  o f the individual-related theorising o f psychology an d  the object-re­
lated  concepts o f historical and  cultural sciences. For him , cu ltu re  is »exter­
nal m ind« in  the sam e way as m ind  is an  in terna l reflection  o f the cu ltura l 
world outside. T herefo re  he tries to conceptualise a sem iodc in te rp re ta tio n  
o f  the functional circle o f the individual and  the cultural environm ent. W hat 
h ap p en s outside the  individual p a r t o f the world, nam ely the  developm ent 
o f cu lture, may be in te rp re ted  as a sem iotic process as well as w hat h appens 
in the in terna l world o f the individual, nam ely build ing  u p  an d  restruc tu r­
ing o f m em ory o r shaping o f habits and  attitudes, and  the processes o f  trans­
fer betw een individual and  culture, nam ely percep tion  and  acting. Thus, we 
may d ifferen tiate  four aspects o f sign form ation  which form  the functional 
circle betw een individual and  culture, nam ely
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•In trO sem iosis o r  p ercep tio n  which den o tes  a sem iotic re la tion  be­
tween cu ltural reality and  its in n er rep resen ta tion  shaped  by individual p er­
cep tion  an d  cognition,
•IntrA sem iosis o r in terna l m ental organisation  which restructu res ex­
perience  accord ing  to previous experiences an d  builds up  the rep resen ta ­
tion  in m em ory. This may also be in te rp re ted  as a sem iotic process;
•ExtrO sem iosis o r »action«, which m eans ex ternal form ation  o f  struc­
tures by m an influencing  and  form ing his cu ltural environm ent. This type 
o f sign generation  also includes creative processes like creating  a w ork o f 
a r t o r executing  a scenic or musical perform ance;
•a n d  finally ExtrAsemiosis which denotes the presence o f created  struc­
tures in and  the p erm an en t changing o f the cultural environm ent which are 
n o t caused by d irect in fluence o f individuals. It is what L a n g  calls the  »ex­
terna l soul«, the p e rm a n en t traces o f hum an  activity and  creativity in  the 
cu ltura l environm ent.
We may derive from  this m odel tha t we will n o t have to face only w hat 
has its place in the ex ternal cu lture as a work o f a rt o r  the beauty o f a lan d ­
scape b u t tha t we may deal with the aesthetic aspects o f  percep tion  an d  o f 
creative acting too and  even, on part o f the in terna l form ation o f structures, 
o f  fantasy in terms of semiotic processes. I th ink  th a t this m odel is m uch closer 
to som e theoretical developm ents within aesthetics than  m ost fo rm er and  
trad itional concepts o f psychology.
You, as aestheticians, may be best suited to assess these theoretical ideas. 
I ho p e  you will agree with m e in the view that these are  impressive exam ples 
in  su p p o rt o f my theses tha t aesthetic experience form s a crucial topic at the 
cross-roads betw een aesthetics and  psychology and  th a t the investigation o f 
aesthetic experience shou ld  be conceived as an  in terdiscip linary  project. It 
was, also with respect to the lim ited time, no t the aim o f this paper to p resen t 
an  elabo rated  in terdiscip linary  theory o f aesthetic experience, b u t I h o p e  I 
was able to convince you th a t it is an in teresting  p ro ject to be developed  in 
fu tu re  co-operation.
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